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Abstract
Extending a standard 2x2 Heckscher−Ohlin model to incorporate emissions, this paper
investigates the effect of differentiated emission taxes on output and emissions in a small
open economy. The following results are derived. First, raising the emission tax imposed on
one industry may increase the output of that industry. This result is quite surprising in the
sense that such a paradoxical result can occur in a simple and standard model under fairly
plausible values of parameters. By numerical examples and using a graphical method, it is
also shown that the mechanism behind the result is the factor market adjustment effects
which work through two different channels. Second, while strengthening emission taxes
uniformly across industries always reduces the volume of emissions, strengthening emission
tax unevenly may increase it.
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Emissions from production activities are one of the major causes of various environ-
mental problems and regulations on emissions are regarded as an important policy
subject (see, for example, UNFCCC, 1997). As a policy instrument for regulating
emissions, emission tax has been attracting much attention and introduced in many
countries. What should be noted is that in actual policies, such emission taxes are
often implemented in a diﬀerentiated way, i.e. some industries are usually imposed
lower tax than other industries or there are industries that are exempted from taxes
(see OECD, 1994). Thus, it is of great importance to analyze what eﬀects such diﬀer-
entiated regulations have on economies.
However, the previous theoretical studies on environmental regulations usually con-
sider uniform emission taxes and the diﬀerentiated emission taxes have not been in-
vestigated adequately. To the author’s knowledge, only exception is Hoel (1996). He
considers the situation where there are both participants and non-participants to an
international environmental agreement and shows that the optimal emission taxes for
participants may be diﬀerentiated across industries. Although he investigates an inter-
esting aspect in environmental regulation, he does not analyze in detail how emission
tax aﬀects output and emissions.
In this paper, we intend to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerentiated emission taxes in
a general equilibrium setting. Extending a standard 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
model to incorporate emissions, we focus on how the diﬀerentiated emission taxes
aﬀect output and emissions. By the term “diﬀerentiated emission tax” here, we mean
a policy that changes the level of emission tax on one industry. Since we assume good
prices as a given constant, our model represents a small open economy.1 Although our
model is a highly simpliﬁed one, we can show clear mechanism of how emission tax
aﬀects output and emissions.
2 The Model
We employ the standard 2 × 2 model and, as in previous literature on the subject,
incorporate emissions as the third production factor.2 Thus, the model has a structure
similar to the standard 2 × 3 HO model employed in Batra and Casas (1976) and Jones
and Easton (1983). However, there is one important diﬀerence from their models: while
1We can also regard the model as a production side of an economy.
2This approach is commonly used in general equilibrium models for environmental analyses, for
example, Yohe (1979), Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), and Ishikawa and Kiyono (2000). The
alternative approach is to assume that emissions are a function of output (and, in some cases, abate-
ment activity) (see, for example, Markusen 1975 and Barrett 1997). Although this emission function
approach may be more straight forward, it is employed mainly for partial equilibrium analyses and
rarely employed in general equilibrium models because of its lack of tractability in general equilibrium
setting. Moreover, the emission function approach, if it does not consider abatement activity, means
that emissions and output have a one-to-one relationship. This does not seem realistic in many situa-
tions because it is often possible to decrease emissions — for example, by introducing new equipment
or by hiring more labor while keeping output constant.
1all factor prices are endogenously determined in the standard 2 × 3 model, the factor
prices corresponding to emissions in our model are policy instruments (i.e. emission
tax) determined exogenously.3
Let vi
j denote the amount of factor j = K,L employed in sector i = 1,2 and vi
Z
denote the level of emission from sector i. The production function of sector i is given

















where aji (j = K,L,Z) is unit factor demand, wj (j = K,L) is the price of factor
j, and wi
Z is the speciﬁc emission tax imposed on sector i. From Shephard’s lemma,
aji = ∂ci/∂wj (j = K,L,Z).
At a competitive equilibrium, unit cost must be equal to price if the commodity is
actually produced and capital and labor must be fully employed. Thus, for i = 1,2,









Z)Qi = vj (1)
where pi is the price of good i and vj is the endowment of factor j. Given commodity
prices, factor endowments, and emission taxes, equilibrium factor prices and outputs
are determined by (1). The level of emissions from sector i is given by vi
Z = aZiQi.
Let θji denote the cost share of factor j in sector i (θji ≡ wjaji/ci) and λji denote the













where a hat over a variable denotes the rate of change (e.g. ˆ wj ≡ dwj/wj). In addition,
we deﬁne |θih
KL| ≡ θKiθLh − θLiθKh, |λih
KL| ≡ λKiλLh − λLiλKh (i,h = 1,2,i ̸= h), and
deﬁne Y ≡
∑
i=1,2 piQi, αj ≡ wjvj/Y , and γi ≡ piQi/Y . αj and γi represent the factor
and sector shares in GDP, respectively. By deﬁnition, we have λji = γiθji/αj. In the
remainder of the paper, we will focus on the eﬀects of the change in the emission taxes
and set ˆ pi = ˆ vj = 0. From (2) and the above notations, the following relations are
derived.





Z + θL1θZ2 ˆ w
2





Z − θK1θZ2 ˆ w
2
Z) (3)
ˆ Q1 = |λ
12
KL|
−1(λL2ˆ βK − λK2ˆ βL) ˆ Q2 = |λ
12
KL|
−1(−λL1ˆ βK + λK1ˆ βL) (4)
where ˆ βj ≡ −
∑
i=1,2 λjiˆ aji.
3The model more similar to ours is the 2 × 3 model with capital mobility like Wong (1995), chapter
4 because one of the factor prices in his model (the rental rate) is also constant. See section 4 for
details.








i = 1,2 j,l = K,L,Z
εi
jl is the price elasticity of unit factor demand in sector i. If εi
jl > (<) 0, factor j
and l are called substitutes (complements) in sector i.4 εi
jl has the following three
properties: (i) εi
lj = θjiεi





jZ = 0 for j = K,L,Z, (iii) because of the concavity of the
cost function, εi








lk must be positive, that is, there is at most one pair of complementary
factors. Moreover, property (ii) and (iii) imply that the following inequality holds for











This means that even if εi
jl < 0 (i.e. factor j and l are complements), the degree of
complementarity is limited by some bound.
In addition, we deﬁne εjl ≡ λj1ε1
jl + λj2ε2
jl. εjl expresses the price elasticity of
total factor demand and has the properties similar to εi
jl: (i) εlj = αjεjl/αl, (ii)
εjK + εjL + εjZ = 0, (iii) εjj ≤ 0. Using these notations, we can rewrite ˆ βj as follows









Below, we basically consider output of sector 1 without loss of generality. The same
arguments can be applied also to ˆ Q2. Combining (3), (4), and (6), we can derive the








































































KL| have the same signs, the fraction 1/|θ12
KL||λ12
KL| is always
positive. Note that the signs and size of all terms depend not only on factor intensities




jl/θli is the well-known Allen’s partial elasticity of substitution (see Chambers, 1988, p. 95).
While most papers including Batra and Casas (1976), Yohe (1979), and Siebert, Eichverger, Gronych
and Pethig (1980) use this Allen’s measure of elasticity, we use εi
jl as Jones and Easton (1983) do.
3Table 1: Three numerical examples illustrating proposition 1.







Case 1 0.5 0.45 0.3 0.65 0.6 0.5 0.5 −0.118 0.5 0.5 −0.171
Case 2 0.7 0.25 0.3 0.65 2.5 1.5 −0.309
Case 3 0.3 0.65 0.5 0.45 0.7 0.5 0.5 2.5 1 0.5 1
θZ1 = θZ2 = 0.05 in all cases.
3 The Eﬀects of Emission Taxes on Outputs
First, let us examine w1
Z on Q1, that is, the eﬀect of the rise in emission tax on sector
1 on its output. The sign of this eﬀect is determined by the sign of A1
1 in (7). Since A1
1
includes a lot of parameters, we cannot derive analytical propositions from it except
for extreme cases.5 However, we can show the following paradoxical proposition by
numerical examples.
Proposition 1 The sign of ˆ Q1/ ˆ w1
Z may be positive, that is, raising emission tax im-
posed on an industry may increase its output.
We show and explain this proposition by giving three numerical examples.6 The
values of the parameters in the three cases are shown in Table 1 and we have ˆ Q1/ ˆ w1
Z >
0 in all three cases (see Appendix 1).7 In Case 1, we assume that K and Z are
complements in both sectors, which is consistent with the empirical result in Chambers
(1988, p. 98).
The proposition is quite counter-intuitive because the rise in emission tax should
have the cost-push eﬀect and thus lead to the downward pressure on the output of the
industry. However, a close look at A1
1 in (7) reveals that, in addition to the cost-push
eﬀect, the rise in the emission tax has another eﬀect. Two eﬀects can be explained as
follows. First, the sector speciﬁc rise in emission tax alters factor prices in the same
way as the fall in the commodity price (see the RHS of (2)). These changes in factor
prices lead to the changes in factor demand and the output is adjusted so as to clear
the factor markets. This eﬀect, which we call the cost-push eﬀect, is represented by the
ﬁrst term in A1
1. In addition, the change in emission tax directly aﬀects factor demand
through substitution (or complementarity) between factors. This substitution eﬀect is
represented by the second term.8
For example, suppose that w1
Z rises by one percent. This has the same impact
on factor prices as a θZ1 percent fall of p1, and its impact on Q1 is represented by
−B1
1θZ1. We can show that this cost-push eﬀect of the rise in w1
Z through factor price
5For example, we can show that when K and L are perfect complements in both sectors, ˆ Q1/ ˆ w1
Z < 0
always holds.
6Of course, one can easily ﬁnd other various cases in which the paradoxical result happens.
7The constraint (5) is satisﬁed in all cases.
8Although we use the term substitution, it does not mean that complementarity is excluded. We















adjustment always decreases the output, i.e. B1
1 ≥ 0 (see Appendix 2 for the proof).
On the other hand, one percent rise in w1
Z raises the demands for capital and labor
by λK1ε1
KZ and λL1ε1
LZ respectively (or reduces them if they are complements). If, for
example, sector 1 has a higher capital-labor ratio than sector 2 (i.e. |θ12
KL| > 0), the
increased demand for capital gives rise to a downward pressure on the output of sector
1 and the increased demand for labor gives rise to a upward pressure. This eﬀect is
represented by the second term. The proposition says that if the substitution eﬀect
works strongly in the opposite direction to the cost-push eﬀect, the rise in the emission
tax on an industry may raise the output of the industry.
Using Case 1, let us explain the intuition of two eﬀects above. In Case 1, it is
assumed that emissions are complement with capital but substitute with labor (ε1
KZ <
0, ε1
LZ > 0), and that sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2 (|θ12
KL| > 0).
Suppose that the emission tax on sector 1 is raised. First, this raises the cost of sector
1 and generates the downward pressure on the output of that sector. On the other
hand, the rise in emission tax on sector 1 decreases capital demand and increases labor
demand through substitution eﬀect and this leads to the fall in the rental rate and the
rise in the wage. As a result of this, more resource is allocated to the capital intensive
industry (sector 1) and the output of that sector tends to increase. What we have
showed that under the numerical values of Case 1, the latter eﬀect indeed dominates
the former eﬀect and the output of that industry increases.
Next, using Case 2 and the ﬁgure 1, we explain two eﬀects above in detail. In Case
2, we assume, for graphical exposition, that capital and labor are perfect complements
5in sector 2 (i.e. ε2
Kj = ε2
Lj for j = K,L,Z).9 Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium in
the output space. The horizontal and vertical axes represent the outputs of sector 1
and 2 respectively. Let the full employment lines for capital and labor at the initial
equilibrium be denoted by line K*K and L*L whose slopes are given by aK1/aK2 and
aL1/aL2. Since in Case 2, the capital-labor ratio in sector 1 is higher than that in sector
2, line K*K is steeper than line L*L. The outputs at the initial equilibrium are given
by the point Q where both factor markets are cleared.
Now suppose that the emission tax on sector 1 is raised by 1%. First, let us consider
the cost-push eﬀect. From (3), 1% rise in w1
Z leads to (0.0235/0.38)% fall in wK and
(0.015/0.38)% rise in wL because the capital-labor ratio in sector 1 is higher than that
in sector 2 (the Stolper–Samuelson eﬀect). Since capital and labor are substitutes in
sector 1, these changes in factor prices lead to the rise in aK1 and the fall in aL1:
ˆ aCP
K1 = 0.28609 and ˆ aCP
L1 = −0.93421 (the superscript CP means cost-push eﬀect).10 On
the other hand, from the perfect complementarity between K and L in sector 2, both
ˆ aCP
K2 and ˆ aCP
L2 are zero (see Appendix 1). Therefore, by the cost-push eﬀect, the full
employment lines shift to K*K’ and L*L’, and outputs shift to Q’ where the output of
sector 1 decreases. As has already been pointed out, the cost-push eﬀect always works
in this direction.
Next, consider the substitution eﬀect. The substitution eﬀect of a tax on input
coeﬃcients in sector 1 is given by ˆ aST
K1 = ε1
KZ × 1 = −0.309 and ˆ aST
L1 = ε1
LZ × 1 = 1.5.
Thus, the substitution eﬀect works in the opposite direction to the cost-push eﬀect.
Moreover, since the size of the substitution eﬀects is larger than that of the cost-push
eﬀects (i.e. |ˆ aST
K1| > |ˆ aCP
K1| and |ˆ aST
L1| > |ˆ aCP
L1|), the substitution eﬀect dominates the cost-
push eﬀect. Taking account of two eﬀects, the full employment lines shift to K*K” and
L*L” and the new equilibrium output shifts to Q”. Therefore, in the example above,
the rise in the emission tax on sector 1 increases the output of sector 1.
Both Case 1 and 2 include complementary factors. However, it does not mean that
complementary factors are necessary for the paradoxical result to occur. This is shown
by Case 3 in which all factors are substitutes in both sectors.
Other cases
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen ˆ Q1/ ˆ w1
Z. Here, for comparison, let us see the
eﬀect of the uniform rise in emission taxes on the output of sector 1. Since the uniform
rise in emission taxes means ˆ w1
Z = ˆ w2
Z > 0, the eﬀect is represented by A1
1 +A1
2. From
9Note that perfect complementarity does not mean Leontief technology (i.e., no substitution).
Leontief technology is represented by εi
jl = 0.
10From the deﬁnition of aji = aji(wK,wL,w1
Z),
ˆ aji = εi
jK ˆ wK + εi
jL ˆ wL + εi
jZ ˆ wi
Z
From this, ˆ aji is decomposed as follows: ˆ aji = ˆ aCP
ji + ˆ aST
ji where ˆ aCP
ji = εi
jK ˆ wK + εi





ji represents the substitution eﬀect of the change in emission tax on input coeﬃcients and
ˆ aCP


























We can show that output of sector 1 can increase when emission taxes are uniformly
raised. For example, consider the case: εi
LZ = εi
KZ = 0 for i = 1,2, and θZ1 < θZ2. In
this case, we have A1
1 + A1
2 > 0. The reason why output of sector 1 increases in the
above example is very simple. By εi
LZ = εi
KZ = 0, the substitution eﬀect disappears
and only the cost-push eﬀect works and since θZ1 < θZ2, sector 1 has a lower share
of emissions and the cost-push eﬀect works more adversely on sector 2. Thus, in the
above example, the uniform rise in emission taxes increases output of sector 1.
The above example shows that the uniform rise in emission taxes can increase
output of sector 1 as the rise in w1
Z can. However, there is a large diﬀerence between
two cases. As the above example shows, in the case of uniform rise, the substitition
eﬀect is not necessary for Q1 to rise. On the other hand, as the arguments in the
previous sections show, in the case of diﬀerentiated rise, the substitition eﬀect needs to
exist and moreover its size must outweight that of the cost-push eﬀect. So, the causes
for decrease in output are completely diﬀerent in two cases.
Finally, let us see ˆ Q2/ ˆ w1
Z, that is, the eﬀect of the rize in emission tax to sector 1
on output of sector 2. The sign of ˆ Q2/ˆ w1
Z is determined by the sign of A2
1, which is
derived by exchanging 1 and 2 of A1
2 in (7). Since the cost-push eﬀect in this case is
likely to work favorably to sector 2 (that is, B2
1 is likely to be positive), the rise in w1
Z
is likely to increase Q2.11 We can easily create an exmple where this indeed holds. For
example, set ε1
LZ = ε2
LZ = 0, ε1
KZ = ε2
KZ = 0. Then, we have A2
1 > 0.
4 The Eﬀects of Emission Taxes on Emissions
In this section, we consider the eﬀects of emission regulations on the level of emissions.
As to emissions, it is the total emissions, rather than those of individual sectors, that
matter. Thus, we focus on the total volume of emissions. The total volume of emissions
is determined by vi
Z = aZiQi, and ˆ vZ =
∑
i λZiˆ vZi. Thus, the rate of change in total











λZi ˆ Qi +
∑
j=K,L




















11Although we can show B1
1 > 0, the sign of B2
1 cannot be determined. Thus, B2
1 may be negative.
7where
C
i = θZi [−(θKh + θLh)αK(θZi − θZh)εKL













First, we consider the eﬀects of the uniform change in emission taxes, therefore, we
set ˆ w1
Z = ˆ w2
Z = ˆ wZ. Then, we can show that ˆ vZ/ˆ wZ < 0, that is, uniformly strength-
ening emission taxes on both industries always reduces the total level of emissions (see
Appendix 3).
Next, let us examine the sector speciﬁc change in emission tax. The sign of this
eﬀect is represented by Ci. Note that since Ci depends on both factor intensities
and elasticities of substitution, its sign cannot be easily determined by some simple
conditions. Therefore, we consider a special case in which εi
LZ = 0 for i = 1,2. This
means that labor and emission are neither substitutes nor complements in both sectors.
This case seems plausible in reality because in most realistic situations emission is
likely to be more closely related to capital than labor. For example, some types of air
pollutants can often be removed by adopting special equipments, but they are hardly
removed by employing more labor.
In this case, Ci reduces to
C






This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If εi
LZ = εh
LZ = 0, aKi/aKh > aLi/aLh > aZi/aZh and θLi > θLh,




LZ = 0, we have εKL > 0, εKZ > 0, and εi
KZ > 0. And since
aKi/aKh > aLi/aLh > aZi/aZh, we have |θih
KL| > 0 and θZi − θZh < 0. Thus, the
proposition immediately follows. Q.E.D.
This means that, for example, if sector i is relatively capital intensive and sector
h is relatively emission intensive, and if the cost share of labor is larger in sector i
than in sector h, a rise in emission tax on sector i (holding emission tax on sector
h constant) increases the total level of emission. The intuitive reasoning is simple.
Under the conditions in the proposition, the rise in emission tax on sector i decreases
the output of sector i and increases that of sector h. Since the expanded sector is
relatively intensive in emissions and the other sector is relatively non-intensive, the
rise in emissions from the expanded sector dominates the fall in emissions from the
contracted sector, and thus, total emissions increase. The same kind of arguments is
valid in the case of εi
KZ = 0. Therefore, we can conclude that strengthening emission
tax may increase the total volume of emissions according to the way in which taxes
are imposed.
85 Further Discussions
In this section, we provide further discussions on our model and its results so as to
make our contribution clear. The ﬁrst point is the relation between our model and the
standard 2 × 3 model. Since our model includes two primary factors and incorporates
emission as the third production factor, it has the structure similar to the standard 2 ×
3 model employed in Batra and Casas (1976) and Jones and Easton (1983). But there is
one important diﬀerence between the standard 2 × 3 model and ours. In the standard 2
× 3 model, all primary factors are treated symmetrically: endowments of three factors
are given exogenously and all factor prices are determined endogenously. On the other
hand, the price of emission in our model (emission tax) is given exogenously and the
volume of emission is determined endogenously. Due to this diﬀerence, the results from
the standard 2 × 3 model are not applicable to our analysis.
The model more similar to ours is the 2 × 3 model with international capital move-
ments employed in Wong (1995, Chap. 4). In his model, the country is assumed to be
a small open economy and the rental price for capital is exogenously given. This means
that Wong’s model has one exogenously given factor price like ours. However, he as-
sumes uniform rental prices among industries and therefore our result of diﬀerentiated
emission taxes cannot be derived from his analysis.
The second point is the relation between our model and a model with 2 × 2 struc-
ture. A lot of theoretical analyses employ a 2 × 2 model with one primary factor and
emissions (e.g. Rauscher, 1994; Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2000). Due to the simplicity of
the model, they often analyze more complicated policy issues than ours such as optimal
emission tax and international trade etc. But as long as such a structure is employed,
the result derived in this paper are excluded because when emission tax is imposed
in a small open economy with such a structure, the production is always specialized
to one sector and one cannot analyze the interaction of two production sectors.12 In
this sense, the model of 2 × 2 structure is not suited to our purpose and our results of
diﬀerentiated emission taxes cannot be derived in such a model.
As these arguments show, our result is a new insight and not what has been showed
in the previous studies.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered the two sector economy with two primary factors
and emissions and have explored the eﬀects of diﬀerentiated emission taxes on output
and emissions. Our ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, increasing the emission
taxes imposed on an industry may increase its output. It is surprising that such a
paradoxical result arises in a simple standard model with plausible parameter values. I
have also shown that the mechanism behind this result is the general equilibrium eﬀect
that operates through factor-market adjustment and that the emission taxes aﬀect
factor demand through two diﬀerent eﬀects (the cost-push and substitution eﬀects).
12Proposition 7 in Ishikawa and Kiyono (2000) shows this.
9Second, while strengthening emission taxes uniformly across industries always reduces
emissions, strengthening emission taxes unevenly may increase them.
As a policy instrument for regulating emissions, emission tax has been attracting
much attention and introduced in many countries. However, our analysis indicates
that according to the way in which emission taxes are introduced, they may have
unintended and detrimental eﬀects on an economy. Therefore, it seems that greater
attention should be paid to how emission taxes are introduced.
10Appendix 1
A1
1 can be rewritten as A1
1 = −γ2(γ1X1 + γ2θZ1θK2X2)/αKαL where X1 = (θK2 +
θL2)2θZ1θK1ε1
KL +θL2θK1[θL2 −θL1(θK2 +θL2)]ε1
KZ +θK2θL1[θK2 −θK1(θK2 +θL2)]ε1
LZ,
and X2 = (θK2 + θL2)hε2
KL + (θL2)2ε2
KZ + θK2θL2ε2
LZ. Inserting numerical values of
Table 1 into this equation leads to ˆ Q1/ ˆ w1
Z > 0. In Case 2, we assume the perfect
complementarity between K and L in sector 2 (i.e. ε2
Kj = ε2
Lj for j = K,L,Z). In
this case, from the property (ii) of εi
jl, we have ε2
KZ = ε2
LZ = −(1 + θK2/θL2)ε2
KL, thus
X2 = 0. When there is a pair of complementary factors, the constraint (5) must be
satisﬁed. In both Case 1 and 2, this constraint is indeed satisﬁed.
Appendix 2
The proof of Bi
i ≥ 0. If all factors are substitutes, Bi
i ≥ 0 is clear. Thus, we have to
prove Bi
i ≥ 0 when there is a pair of factors which are complements. We provide the
proof in the case of εi
KL < 0 for i = 1,2, that is, the case where capital and labor are
complements in both sectors. Similar arguments can be applied to the other cases.

















































































































The sign of ˆ vZ/ ˆ wZ depends on the sign of C1 + C2. It is given by
C
1 + C
2 = − β[(θZ1 − θZ2)
2αKεKL + (θL1 − θL2)
2αKεKZ
+ (θK1 − θK2)
2αLεLZ]
11Following the same procedure as when we prove Bi
i ≥ 0, we can show C1 + C2 ≤ 0.
However there is an easier way to prove it.
Since the equivalence between tax and quota holds in the model, the eﬀects of the
uniform rise in emission tax can be derived from the eﬀects of the reduction in country-
wide emission quota. If we interpret emission quota as factor endowment, the latter
eﬀect has already been derived in Batra and Casas (1976), theorem 1: the decrease in
the supply of a factor (emission quota) always raises the reward of that factor (emission
permit price). This result and the equivalence between both policies imply that the
uniform increase in emission tax always reduces the volume of emission.
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